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SUMMARY
l3oth the size and the structure of the senior corporate executive's com-
pensation package have undergone substantial and iniportant changes
over the last quarter century.While this is perhaps not an unanticipated
conclusion, neither the dimensions nor the pace of these changes have
been thus far adequately stressed. The objective here has l)ecn to remedy
this deficiency by developing and applying techniques of valuation which
provide an accurate and comprehensive measure of the worth of the pa''
package to its recipient at any point in time. Because of their key role
in the business community in general. and their influence on patterns of
compensation policy in particular. the senior olhcers of fifty of the
country's largest manufacturing corporations were chosen as the focus
for the study. In all, the sample included data or the experience of
approximately 550 executives and covered some 8,000 man-years' worth
of compensation history, giving rise to a record of secular changes
which begins in 1940 and continues through 1963.
The Findings
White top executives' salary and bonus income has increased by 83
per cent before taxes and 33 per cent after taxes since 1940. their ag-
gregate after-tax remuneration has approximately doubled. Deferred and
contingent rewards, which now comprise about half the compensation
package, have accounted for the major portion of this increase. The re-
stricted stock option, created by tax legislation in the early 1950's. has
been an especially important item, providing nearly one-third of all
after-tax remuneration enjoyed b' senior executives in recent years. As
a result of this development and the concomitant growth in the popular-
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ity of other forms of reward that utilize shares of the employer corpora-
tion's common stock as the compensation medium, the year-to-year
volatility of the value of the managerial pay package has increased sub-
stantially over time, and the individual executive's earnings have become
more closely linked to the market fortunes of his firm's shareholders.
Because such rewards began to come into wide use primarily in the
late 1940's and early 1950's, most of the growth in pay we observe
occurred within the ten years immediately following World War II.
That growth has not, however, been very impressive in comparison
with most historical indexes. In the aggregate, the sales, assets, profits,
and market value of the corporations for which the executives in the
sample worked grew much more rapidly than either the salaries and
bonuses or the total compensation of those executives. Other important
professional groupsphysicians, lawyers, and dentistshave also done
better over time; their 1963 after-tax incomes ranged from 2.4 to 3.2
times the corresponding 1940 figures as compared with 2.1 for top
executives. Manufacturing production workers earned 3.6 times as much
after taxes in 1963 as in 1940, and the take-home pay of the individuals
at the bottom of the corporate managerialhierarchyrecent MBA
graduatesincreased by approximately 400 per cent. Upon adjusting for
price changes, in fact,it turns out that the senior executives in our
sample were no better off in 1963 than in 1940 in termsof real after-
tax income. In large part, these developments canbe attributed to a
sharp rise in personal tax rates, which has had aparticularly severe im-
pact on high-income groups such as executives. It seemslikely, however,
that the nature of the compensation bargaining processand the publicity
given top executive rewards by the proxy statementreporting require-
ments of the SEC have also contributeddownward pressures.
Looking in cross section at the remunerationenjoyed by the five
highest-paid executives in each of the firmsin the sample, we find that
the salary and bonus differentials between the topexecutive and his four
closest subordinates have narrowedconsiderably over the last twenty-
five years. The typical second- throughfifth-ranking executives in large
manufacturing corporations now receive,respectively, 75, 64, 57, and
53 per cent as much before-tax salaryand bonus as their firm's senior
officer. In 1940-41 the figures were 62, 50,44, and 39 per cent. De-
spite these changes, it remains true thatboth the absolute and percent-280 1XiCt'I'II('O1'\1PINSAIION
age gaps bet\veCri successivepoS!l ions increase stcdjIas the individtiLl
climbs the execi it ive ladder.
The history of the more pertifleiit aggregate remuneration profile is
(itlite different.When the vaRies of the various supplements to salary
and bonus are considered,the pereeluage Compensation dillerentjafs
among the top live executiVepositions prove to he almost exactly the
same in recent years asthey were in the early 1940's. In relation to the
total after-tax earnings of thehighest-paid executive, those for the other
four positions studicd came to67. 56. 45. and 3$ per cent for the inter-
val 1955-63 as compared with 64, 53.45, and 40 per cent in 1940-41
Taken in conjLiilCtion with the salary andliontis time series., this phe-
nomenon suggests stronglythat the corporations in the sample not only
plan their compensation packages in acomprehensive maniier, but have
been guided in so doing by a desire to maintain the after-tax structure
ot rewards in the senior executive ranksintact in the face of substan-
tial increases in personal tax rates. The remarkable stability of the struc-
ture during a period in which the rewards inquestion doubled in size
seems to attest either to the skill orthe good tortunc connected with
that effort.
This result was, of course, achieved b' a policy of utilizing more ex-
tnsivly at higher executive levels the leSS heaviltaxed (leferred and
contingent compensation arrangements as adjuncts to salary and bonus
payments. '[he value of each of the major instruments n that category
pensions. stock options, deferred compensation. and profit-sharing plans
--increased steadily in importance from the fifth-ranking to the top
executive position in everyear considered. I3etween 1955 and 1963.
for example. 3 I. 36, 44. 50. and 62 per cent of all after-tax remunera-
tion associated with the live positionsin ascending orderwas gen-
erated by means other than direct cash payments. Since manof these
arrangements depend for their value en the market price behavior of
the corporation's common stock, the volatility of the pay package also
increased correspunditudy. Not surprisingly, stock options accounted for
most of the fluctuations observed.
In collecting the data for these comparisons, information as to the
ages of the executives and their terms in ollice necessarily became avail-
able. It was found that the individuals who occupied cacti of the top
five positions in the sample corporations in the earlyI 960's were ap-SUMMARY 281
proximately live years older on average than were their predecessors of
the early 1940's. fhe mean length ol tulie the various positions were
held by the same individual also appears to have diminished slightly.
When the cross-sections are '.icwed in terms of intercompany pat-
terils of reward. WC diSCover that exeCutive Compensation practices
vary much less widely than do the measurable attributes of the employer
corporations thiemsc-lves The dispersion in the saniple of both salary
and bonus and aggregate remuneration levels among senior executives
is substantially smaller than that displayed by the assets, sales, profits,
and niarket values of their firmsa phenomenon which is more pro-
nounced 110W luauit was twenty-lIve years ago. In addition, the coriclu-
sion arrived at earlier, that over time the earnings of top executives
have not kept pace with the expansion of tile corporations for which
they work, is reinforced when that coniparison is made on a company-
by-company basis. In only about 10 per cent of tile eases examined did
the compensation associated with the senior executive position in a given
firm grow as rapidly betweenI 940 and 1963 as even the most sluggish
index of the company's growth.
The dominant role of deferred and contingent rewards in the pay
package is underlined htile ROOf performance of corporate salary and
bonus scales as predictors of total compensation levels. There arc sharp
and consistent differences between tile schedules obtained by ranking
firms according to the amount of direct current remuneration received
by their top executives and those constructed from thecorresponding
aggregate reimuneration figures. The resulting rankcorrelation coeffi-
cients are typically on the order of .4 to .6. and have declined overtile
years as supplenients to salary and bonushave increased in popularity
and value. A similar story emerges from a comparison ofsalary and
bonus and total compensation growth rates since 1940.The coefficients
calculated by matching those two sets of rankings runanywhere from
.1to .4 and satisfy significance tests at the.01 level only in scattered
instances.
There is considerable evidence, on tile other hand,that top executive
earnings and eniployer-conlpany size arcdirectly related. Insofar as
there is a difference in the degree to which such arelationship appears
among the various criteria tabulated, afirm's profits seem a somewhat
better predictor of the probable magnitudeof its senior otlicers' re-EXFCUTJVE COM PENSATION
wards than do either its assets.its sales, or the market value of its com-
mon stock- The connectionbetween executive salat ics and bonuses and
each of those items is consistently strongerthan between the latteranc
the same individuals' total after-taxrcniuneratiOfl. We also have sorm in-
dication that the larger and moreprofitable the corporation, the more it
makes use of supplements to salaryand bonus for its senior executives
a phenomenon which,while persistent, is sufficiently mild that it could
be as much a result of certaintechnical features of the compensation
process as a policydecision in its own right.Itis clear, however, that
the frms in the sample whichprovide their top management with the
highest levels of aggregate remuneration areprecisely those which utilize
such supplements most cxtensiveiy.
The Current Equivalents
The key to the analysis, of course, is the conceptof a "current income
equivalent" for each deferred and contingent compensation arrangement
in the pay package. Upon the design andimplementation of these indexes
of the worth of such instruments aspension plans, stock option grants,
and deferred compensation contracts rests the validity of the conclusions
summarized above. The principles underlying their development through-
out have been that (1) it is possible to cast up as analternative to every
noncurrent form of reward a stream of salary paymentsbetween which
and the reward itself the executive would be indifferent, and (2) that
"indifference" is most appropriately defined in terms of after-tax presem
values. An attempt has been made in each instance to duplicate in the
current equivalent not only the compensatory achievementsbut the
volatility and incentive features of the device being evaluated. The early
chapters of the study spell out the particulars of that effort. The conten-
tion is that a corporation could, if it chose, substitute for any one of the
arrangements considered the hypothetical series of salary payments
which constitute its indicated current equivalent without diminishing
either the earnings or the dedication of the firm's executives. In that
sense the total of these equivalents provides an accurate andmeaningful
measure of the value of a compensation package whichconsists in fact
of a wide variety of quite dissimilar components. Fortunately, this total
turns outat least insofar as the present sample is concernedtObeaffected very little by rather broad changes in assumptions as to the
characteristics of the environment in vhich rewards arc received and the
nature of executives' market alternatives. It therefore should be possible
to have sonic confidence that the numbers generated permit an accurate
appraisal of the historical record.
Additional Research
As has been suggested at several points along the way, the analysis
presented falls considerably short of exhausting the opportunities for re-
search in this area. For example, the question of the relationship between
employer-company size and top executive pay was examined only
tentatively here. Because of the likely impact on the compensation de-
cision both of other characteristics of the individual firm and certain
features of its environment, the attempts thus far made to isolatethe
influence of corporate size or profitability per se have notbeen very
successful. Moreover, they have dealt only with salary and bonusawards
rather than with the total pay package. Nowthat it is possible to speak
in terms of the latter, the way is open to collectand process the addi-
tional data which will permit these other factors to berecognized and a
more meaningful analysisundertaken.
A second item of interest is the compensationexperience of executives
who occupy positions in the corporatemanagerial hierarchy below those
which comprise the current sample. There is reason tobelieve that many
of the conclusions which emerge from thehistorical record of senior
executives' rewards may not hold for lower-leveladministrators. The
major obstacles to further research in this area arethe difficulty in obtain-
ing comprehensive and reliable dataand the question of accurate job
definition. Since the information available in proxystatements covers just
the top few men in each firm, theeconomic circumstances of subordinate
officials can be investigated only by securingthe cooperation of a group
of interested companies and acquiringthe necessary data directly from
them. This having been done, theproblem then is to make sure that the
data provided relate to the same sort ofpositions in each firm and that
those positions remain intact throughout thetime period studied. While
not impossible, this is plainly a hardertask than that tackled here.
An issue raised in connection withthe incentive aspects of various
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forms of rewardthe patternof stock hoidnigs among top CXCcUtjvCs_
also deserves further attentiOn.Theextell Ito which such indi\j(1flds
normally maintaill a signilicantownership interest in their respective
firmsis important to the argo !nentthat Compensation arrangen)en
utilizing shares of theemployer corporations common stock Should be
made available in order to encouragedgreater degree ot identification
with shareholder ohjectivesand tothe argument that there is not
sufficient such identilication.lortunately. data pertaining to stock hold-
ingsarepublished annually in corporations proxy statements and are
supplemented monthly by an SECrecord of their officers' transactions.
A sample of executiveslike that compiled for the present study is a
nttural starting pomt.
A somewhat different hutequally compelling Problem concerns the
attitudes and reactions of the twoparties to the compensation bargain.
Whether in most cases the executiveand the employer company both
have an accurate appreciation ofthe value of the various deferred and
contingent rewards in the pay packageis clearly goins to have an effect
on the nature of thesettlements they produce. Given the techniques
developed above for making such appraisals for a broad rangeof devices,
it would be of interest to determine howclose the perceptions of execu-
tives and compensation administrators actually are tothese figures, to
what extent and in what manner cx ante estimatesof compensatory value
are made, whether either partyattributes differential incentive features
to the several instruments employed, andhow large a factor cost
comparisons are in the decisions. In short, weneed a better understand-
ing of the compensation process as it is viewed from theinside in order
to test the external evaluation presented here.
Finally, the same sort of historical and cross-sectional analysis per-
formed for large manufacturing corporations should be expanded to en-
compass other important categories of businessactivity. The compen-
sation experience of the top executives of public i.itility companies,of
financial institutions, of firms engaged in retail trade. of transportation
companies, and of a sample of smaller manufacturingenterprises may
or may not differ significantly from that depicted above but, in anyevent,
isrelevant to a comprehensive appraisal of the secular growthand
current pattern of managerial remuneration in the community. Thetech-SUMMARY 285
niques elllJ)lOyCd in the present stlI(l\' are directly transferable to such
an investigation-
The twofold objective here. therefore. has been to develop a flexible
conceptual framework in WhiCh the value to an individual executive of
the many disparate components of his pay package can be measured
andto applY that franicwork empirically in order to determine the
manner in which corporations have recast their compensation policies
over time in response tochanges in the tax laws and in the economic
environment. It is hoped that both the approach taken and the findings
presented provide a basis and an inCentive for additional research,